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Within the past five years the motor vehicle for hire has
developed from insignificance to a formidable position in our
transportation system. Mlotor busses, for years confined to
short-haul traffic wholly within large cities, now swarm the
inter-city and inter-state highways of the country, operating
upon regular schedules throughout the year.'  The motor truck
has revolutionized short-haul shipping and terminal operations.-
So long as the motor vehicle was employed chiefly for private
'The following table summarizes bus operation, as of January 1, 1926;
by January 1, 1927 these numbers will be increased about 3 1!,.5 if the
same annual rate of increase is maintained for 1926 which obtained for
1925.
No. of No. of Mile3 of
Vehicles Companies Route
Common Carriers ........... 28,145 6,455 232,310.6
Non-Common Carriers ....... 29,605 15,177 334,401
Total .................. 57,750 21,G32 566,741.0
This census of vehicles, according to a careful survey, covers only 80%
of the total, which is placed at 70,000. Loomis, Howv the B=s Industry is
Built Up (1926) 5 Bus TRANSPORTATION, 69 '.t seq.
2 For a single example: The Pennsylvania Railroad has displaced local
freight trains by trucks on one thousand miles; its trucks serve 500 sta-
tions with 650 tons of less-than-carload shipments daily. See (1926) 81
RAILWAY AGE, 595 ff.
See articles published by the Motor Truck Committee, National Auto-
mobile Chamber of Commerce, Co-ordinated Trazsportation Series (1923-
1925) Numbers 1-13; Report of Special Committee IV of the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States (1923); Budd, The Relation of Highway
Transportation to the Railway, address before the American Society of
Civil Engineers, April 14, 1926, at Kansas City, Mo.; Powell, Function of
the Motor Truck in Reducing Cost and Preventing Congestion of Freight
E 163 ]
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use, it presented no grave problem of regulation. The cities and
states could feel that their duty had been fulfilled by the enact-
ment of safety regulations, traffic rules, speed laws, or laws to
protect the highway from abuse. But when the motor vehicle
suddenly developed on a huge scale into a public carrier, such
regulations became wholly inadequate, and the legislatures were
not slow to respond to the need for a different type of regula-
tion-a regulation not simply of the physical operation but of
the business now "affected with a public interest." 3
The motor carrier 4 presented to the legislatures at least three
kinds of regulatory problems, all requiring for their solution
some limitation upon those seeking entrance into this field of
carriage. The first problem was to protect the costly public
highways from over-use by hordes of competing motor carriers
employing giant vehicles, and to render the highways less
hazardous for pedestrians and riders. The then existing motor
vehicle laws regulating physical operation were generally in-
adequate. The second problem and one more difficult, compli-
cated as it was with economic implications, arose out of the
vigorous competition between these new carriers, with their
relatively small investment, and the established steam and elec-
tric railways.0 Passenger revenues on short-haul traffic had
in Railroad Terminals (1924) 116 ANNALs OF THE AmER. ACAD. OF POLITI-
cAL AND SoCIAL SCIENCE, 87; see also infra note 93.
3 During the past three years 25 states have brought carriers under
state regulation by special enactments or greatly changed their existing
laws.
1923: California, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, Virginia; 1925: Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minne-
sota, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Ver-
mont, Wisconsin, Wyoming; 1926: Louisiana, Mississippi, Kentucky, New
Jersey.
4Although many statutes describe this class of carriers as "motor vehi-
cles for hire" or "auto transportation companies," the term "motor carrier"
seems preferable and is common in recent enactments. See Iowa Acts
1925, c. 5; Kan. Laws 1925, c. 206, § 1 (b); Okla. Laws 1923, c. 113, §
1 (b); S. D. Laws 1925, c. 224. See also Ill. Commerce Comm. Gen Order
116, rule 1.
5 Most states have been forced to impose restrictions upon weight, width,
number of trailers, etc.; such restrictions upon excessively large or heavy
vehicles are usually to be found in the highway statutes, often administered
by a highway commission or its equivalent. E.g. Me. Laws 1921, c. 211,
§ 25, c. 187, c. 211, §§ 16, 17, 18, 20; W. Va. Code Ann. (Barnes, 1923) c.
43, § 12. The lengthy preamble to Nev. Laws 1925, c. 161, states that the
operation of heavy motor vehicles "is known to rapidly destroy the said
roads and improved highways so as to increase the cost of maintenance
."; similar declarations appear, in one form o'r another, in other
statutes.
In reversing an order of the Illinois Commerce Commission, granting
a certificate to a bus line which was in competition with rail carriers, Mr.
Justice Thompson made the following extreme comment:
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already been seriously invaded by the private automobile when
the motor carrier entered the field on a big scale; more and
more local trains were abandoned.7 The electric railways suf-
fered even more than the steam; thousands of miles of track
were abandoned; passenger receipts fell one-third.8 The third
problem was closely related to the second: the cut-throat com-
petition between motor carriers themselves, fatal to the public
"The savings of hundreds of thousands of investors have been massed
to build our great network of railroads, and these transportation systems
are entitled to protection from irresponsible competition. If shoestring
transportation companies, with no money invested in right of way and no
reserve capital . . . are permitted to drop in here and there and take
the cream of the transportation business from the permanent transportation
systems, disastrous results are inevitable." Choate v. Commerce Comm.,
309 IMI. 248, 256, 141 N. E. 12, 15 (1923).
And in Re Application of McClain (1924) Ohio Pub. Util. Comm. tDoclet
No. 3234, the Ohio commission made the following interesting comment:
"Counsel for the applicants contend that as the present Norfolk & West-
ern Railway superseded the canal, which, in turn, had superseded the stage
coach, and, as to passenger traffic and local parcel freight, had been -super-
seded between Chillicothe and Columbus by the traction line, the public
automobile is here as the successor of the electric railway . . . we are
keenly aware of edsting conditions in the transportation field and believe
that the law here involved has as much purpose of conserving edsting
transportation facilities as of stabilizing the new service."
7 In 1920 class I steam carriers produced a total of 46,848,688,000 pas-
senger miles; in 1925 this had shrunk to 35,963,862,000. In 1920 the rail-
roads carried 1,269,912,000 passengers; in 1925 the figure was 8S6,650,000,
the lowest passenger carriage since 1908. See Trumbower, Economicz of
Highway Transportation (1926) 31 JOURNAL OF THE WESrTRN SoCmT' Or
ENGINEERS, 147. It has been stated that the 255 decline in rail passenger
business is confined chiefly to short haul traffic. Slater, The Motor-Bus as
a Competitor of the Railroads (1926) 2 JOURNAL OF I= & PuULiC UTnarnr
ECONOmCS, 129, 131.
The figures for the first six months of 1926 show a continued deerease
in passengers carried. See Statistics of Railways of the United State.,
Interstate Commerce Commission, June 30, 1926.
In recent testimony before Interstate Commerce Commissioner Esch,
investigating the motor carrier situation, similar injury to freight businezs
was disclosed. For example, on the Denver & Rio Grande Western, for
the year ending February 28, 1921, less than carload shipments between
Denver and Trinidad totalled 19,967 tons, with a revenue of $191,035; for
the year ending February 28, 1926, the tonnage was 13,110, and the revenue-
$139,425. (Testimony taken in Docket No. 18300). See (192G) 5 Bus
TRANSPORTATION, 593.
8 In the past 10 years 54 electric railway companies have abandoned all,
operation, 97 have abandoned rail service entirely, now rendering service
by motor-bus, and 79 have abandoned part of their rail system, replacing-
it with bus service. See Replacement of Electric Railway. by Bzwscs
(1926) 5 Bus TRANSPORTATION, 72. On the loss of revenues see statement
of Charles L. Henry, General Counsel, American Electric Railway AsZocia-
tion: Hearings before Interstate Commerce Committee on S. 2306, 69th
Cong. 1st Sess. 98 (March, 1926).
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need for efficient permanent service. It is our purpose to dig-
cuss the efforts of the states, through legislature, commission
and court, to meet these latter-day problems of regulation.
With few exceptions, comprehensive regulation of motor car-
riers begins with a grant of power to the existing public utility
commission, either by a special act applicable alone to motor
carriers, by a statute specifically placing the new kind of public
utility under the general public utility act, or by construction
of existing provisions to include them. Where commission regu-
lation has been adopted, it has been coupled with the require-
ment that before motor carriers may begin operation, they must
obtain from the commission a certificate or permit, evidencing
the commission's opinion that the "public convenience and neces-
sity" require such operation. 9 This has been the legal device
which the legislatures and their agents, the commissions, have
employed in their efforts to control the economic situation pro-
duced by the rise of the motor carrier. In our discussion it will
only be necessary, therefore, to treat of certificates of conveni-
ence and necessity.
HISTORY AND NATURE OF CERTIFICATES
The formula of "public convenience and necessity" is by no
means a new one. For many years the phrase-or its alter-
native, "'common convenience and necessity"-ran through the
highway construction statutes. A state statute would impose
a duty to build highways in certain localities, if in the judgment
of those in authority such construction was required by "public
9 Ariz. Acts 1919, c. 130; Calif. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1923) Act 5129;
Colo. Comp. Laws (1921) § 2914; Conn. Pub. Acts 1921, c. 77, § 3; 111. Rev.
Stat. (Cahill, 1923) c. lla, § 71; Ind. Acts 1925, c. 46, § 2; Iowa Acts
1925, c. 5, § 4; Kan. Laws 1925, c. 206, § 5; Ky. Act of March 5, 1926, §
3; La. Act of July 15, 1926, § 3; Me. Laws 1921, c. 184 and Me. Laws 1925,
c. 211; Md. Ann. Code (Bagby, 1924) art. 56, §§ 255, 262; Mass. Acts 1925,
c. 280; Mich. Pub. Acts 1923, No. 209; Minn. Laws 1925, c. 185, § 5 (a);
Miss. Laws 1926, c. 128, §§ 1, 6; Mont. Laws 1923, c. 154, § 4; Nov. Laws
1925, c. 161, § 3; N. H. Laws 1919, c. 86, § 2; N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill,
1923) c. 64, § 26; N. C. Law's1925, c. 50, § 3; N. D. Laws 1925, c.
91, § 5; Pa. Stat. (West, 1920) §§ 18150, 18088; 1 Ohio Gen. Code (Page,
1926) §§ 614-87, 614-88; Okla. Laws 1923, c. 113, § 4; R. I. Gen. Laws
1923, § 3724; S. D. Laws 1925, c. 224; S. C. Acts 1925, No. 170; Utah Comp.
Laws (1917) § 4818; Vt. Laws 1925, No. 74, § 2; Va. Acts 1924, c. 222;
Wash. Laws 1921, c. 111, § 4; W. Va. Code (Barnes, 1925) c. 43, § 82;
Wis. Stat. 1925, § 194.02. The Arkansas commission's assumption of juris-
diction without such a statutory requirement has very recently been hold
to be unjustified. Arkansas Railroad Comm. v. Independent Bus Lines, 285
S. W. 388 (Ark. 1926). Wyoming's commission also makes this require-
ment, relying upon Wyo. Laws 1915, c. 146, § 45, although this section
does not seem to sustain the jurisdiction.
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convenience and necessity"; the enforcement of the duty, that is,
the application and construction of the phrase, was imposed upon
the courts.0 The test was also employed in the direct statutory
regulation of public utilities which preceded the era of commis-
sion control. So, in Re Shelton Raflway," the statute regulat-
ing street railways denied such carriers the right to build their
lines parallel to a steam or electric road unless a county court
should return a finding that "public convenience and necessity
required" the construction; in its opinion the court discusses
the meaning of the phrase.12 Although common enough in state
public utility legislation, until the Transportation Act, 1920,
amending the Interstate Commerce Act, this expedient had ap-
parently not been employed in the regulation of interstate com-
merce. By paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 of section 1 of that Act"3
Congress required all carriers under the jurisdiction of the Act
to secure such a certificate before extending their old lines or
constructing new ones, or before acquiring or operating a rail-
road or extension; the same requirement was laid down before
any carrier might abandon any part of its line.
The primary purpose of requiring motor carriers to secure
certificates of convenience and necessity "is not regulation with
a view to safety or to conservation of the highways, but the
prohibition of competition. It determines not the manner of
use, but the persons by whom the highways may be used..
[It] is designed primarily to promote good service by excluding
unnecessary competing carriers." 14 It effects this purpose in
at least two ways: first, by giving the commission the power to
refuse to permit motor carrier operation in a given territory
where the existing transportation facilities seem to meet the
public need or convenience, or where the motor applicant seems
for any reason unfit; second, it gives an authorized motor car-
rier a right of substance in which he will be protected, upon
application to the conunission or the courts, against uncertified
carriers seeking to compete with him.
10 See Fenwick Hall Co. v. Town of Old Saybrook, 69 Conn. 32 (1897).
1169 Conn. 626 (1897).
12 The court said at 631: "So in the statute under consideration, the
'public convenience and necessity' sufficient to 'require the construction of
such street railway,' means a condition existing at the time of the applica-
tion, in respect to the applying railroad, the mode of public travel, the
manner in which those needs are to supplied, and the probable effect of the
proposed road upon the whole question of adequately supplying thoze needs
that, in the judgment of the trier, will justify the interference
with private rights involved."
"341 Stat. 456, at 477-473, (1920) U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1923) §5
8563(17)-8563(20).
14 Mr. Justice Brandeis, for the court, in Buck v. Kuykendall, 2G7 U. S.
307, 315, 45 Sup. Ct. 324, 326 (1925).
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The object of a certificate does not seem to be to grant a legal
monopoly, nor is its effect in practice the same as a franchise
monopoly; for, if the need for additional service justifies, it is
the duty of the commission to grant additional certificates to
other qualified applicants. The number of certificates in a
certain field is limited only by the demands of public necessity
and convenience. Some statutes or regulations specifically deny
that a certificate is the grant of a monopoly. 15 The effect is
certainly to regulate and restrict competition between carriers,
by deciding which one or ones shall be allowed to operate, and
then regulating their business while protecting them from the
competition of the unauthorized.'l  While the certified carrier
benefits, this is said to be incidental to the purpose of insuring
reliable, continuous and efficient service for the community.,
The prospect of a public utility seeking and being granted legal
protection against competition is not a new one. It has been
pointed out that such famous cases as the Charles River Bridge
case 8 and the Binghampton Bridge case 9 are early instances.2
There has been some discussion in the cases as to the legal
nature of a certificate of public convenience and necessity, but
only after a considerable accretion of decisions has formed about
the statutes can an authoritative definition be formulated.
That the certificate, in the hands of one authorized to operate
under it, is an interest of substance, a property right, seems
clear.21 In case after case, the courts have granted injunctions
to certificate holders against unauthorized operation along the
same route by other motor carriers. Almost all the statutes
provide means whereby the commissions may protect certificate
holders by action against unauthorized operation.22 It is the
opinion of the Utah Supreme Court that "such a certificate is in
's See Ill. Rev. Stat. (Cahill, 1923) c. lla, § 71; Mont. Laws 1923, c.
154, § 4; N. D. Laws 1925, c. 91, § 4; and see Vt. Gen. Laws (1917) § 5068,
and in Re James, 132 Atl. 40 (Vt. 1926). The Illinois provision seems
utterly without meaning in view of such a case as Egyptian Transportation
System v. Louisville & N. R. R., 321 Ill. 580, 152 N. E. 510 (1926).
16 See an excellent note in (1920) 33 HARV. L. REV. 576.
1' See Choate v. Commerce Comm., supra note 6.
18 Charles River Bridge Co. v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420
(U. S. 1837).
19 The Binghampton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51 (U. S. 1865).
20 (1920) 33 HARv. L. REv. 576, 577.
21 The property which a certificate holder receives is an additional illus-
tration of the creation by the law-maker (in this instance, the legislature
and its agent) of a property right, that is, a right to act which the state
will protect or enforce. See Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 394 (U. S. 1798);
Eaton v. Railroad, 51 N. H. 504, 511 (1872) ; 2 AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURIS-
PRUDENCE (1863) 35; Abbot, The Police Power and the Right to Compcn-
sation (1889) 3 HARV. L. REV. 189, 190.
22 See infra page 193.
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the nature of a limited franchise, and authorizes the grantee in
the certificate to operate a utility over the designated routes and
likewise protects him against interference by the others unless
authorized by the commission." ._,3 The fact that the certificate
is revokable for cause, after hearing, does not seem to change
its character as a property right, since by the terms of the
statutes the certificates are granted upon the condition that they
may be revoked for certain causes or within the judgment of the
commission.24 The privileges appertaining to such certificates,
like the benefits granted by a franchise 5 have been held to be
non-transferable, and personal to the grantee. "It has been
the theory of the Public Utility Commission," said Mr. Justice
Robinson in Estabrook v. Public Utilities Commission of Oldo,-G
"that the motor transportation act was enacted for the purpose
of promoting the public convenience and necessity and not for the
purpose of creating a property light in any particular route in
the recipient of any such certificate; that whatever personal
advantage inures to such recipient is an incident to the carrying
out of the purpose of serving the public convenience and neces-
sity, but is not an object of the act; that the certificate is per-
sonal in character, and does not pass by assignment, succession,
descent, or by any other process, from the recipient to any one
else." 27  Many statutes provide, however, that a certificate may
be transferred, if the commission gives its approval.25
In the meager light which the courts have shed upon the legal
23See Public Utility Comm. v. Garviloch, 54 Utah, 406, 414, 181 Pac.
272, 275 (1919). See also Re Yaldma-Northern Stages, Inc., Pub. Util.
Rep. 1925 C. 220 (Wash. 1925) where it was said that a certificate is
subject to the protection granted property by the due process of law clause.
24 See infra page 189.
25 See 2 WYmAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS (1911) § 1426.
26112 Ohio St. 417, 419, 147 N. E. 761, 762 (1925). By change in the
Ohio statute, the certificates now pass by descent. See Ohio Gen. Code
(Page, 1926) § 614-87a.
27 See also Red Ball Transit Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 112 Ohio St.
462, 147 N. E. 762 (1925).
28 Ariz. Acts 1919, c. 130, § 3 (e); Calif. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1923)
Act 5129, § 5; D. C. Ann. Code (1924) appendi,, Pub. Util. par. 54; Iowa
Acts 1925, c. 5, § 11; Ky. Act of March 5, 1926, § 12; Minn. Laws 1925, c.
185, § 9; Miss. Laws 1926, c. 128, § 9; Mont. Laws 1923, c. 154, § 4; X. J.
Laws 1926, c. 144, § 3; N. C. Laws 1925, c. 50, § 3(d) (5); N. D. Laws
1925, c. 91, § 5; Or. Gen. Laws (Spec. Sess.) 1921, c. 10, § 4; S. D. Laws
1925, c. 224, § 12; Wash. Laws 1921, c. 111, § 4; W. Va. Code (Barnes,
1925) c. 43, § 82.
In Kansas a purchaser or assignee seems to have a right to the privileges
of the certificate purchased regardless of commission approval. Kan. Laws
1925, c. 206, § 4. In Michigan there can be no assignment of permits.
Mich. Pub. Acts 1923, No. 209, § 1. In Ohio the personal representative
of a deceased certificate holder succeeds to his ancestor's rights thereunder,
out in cases of other transfers, or continuation by surviving partners, the
transfer must be approved. 1 Ohio Code (Page, 1926) 614-87a.
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position of the certificate of convenience and necessity, it seems
to be revealed as sui generis, standing somewhere between a
franchise on the one extreme, and a mere license on the other.
It is well established that a franchise or consent granted to a
corporation, when accepted or acted upon, becomes property of
which it is said the grantee cannot be "deprived without due
process of law and without compensation." In Colonial Motor
Coach Corporation v. City of Oswego,29 the common council, by
ordinance, granted a "consent" to the plaintiff motor bus com-
pany to operate an inter-city route through the city. The com-
pany then applied to the public service commission for a cer-
tificate, but a decision upon the application had not been made
when the council withdrew the "consent." The court granted the
plaintiff's motion continuing an injunction pendente lite, and
held that the "consent," acted upon by the company, constituted
a franchise and a contract which the council could not constitu-
tionhlly revoke. The court brushed aside the argument that
"consent" to operate the bus route and a franchise are different
things, saying, "To my mind it is not necessary to draw any fine-
spun distinctions between a franchise and a consent, or to decide
whether the ordinance . . . was technically one or the other.
That resolution conferred a privilege upon the plaintiff to oper-
ate its busses over the streets named, without which it would
have been unlawful for the plaintiff to so do." 30 Presumably
this court would have regarded the revocation of a certificate
of convenience in a similar light.3 1
Contrasted with the care with which the holder of a franchise
must be handled, so long as he is complying with its terms and
fulfilling his obligations, is the uncertain tenure of a licensee.
The holder of a city license to operate a motor vehicle may have
his license revoked at will, and without a hearing.32  In Burgess
v. Brockton33 the court said, "The petitioners have been licensed
to transport passengers for hire. Their investment is not by
its nature so irrevocably devoted to that service as is that of
the street railway," and accordingly the license was treated as
a mere privilege or permission, and was revoked when its exer-
cise adversely affected the city's street railway system.
Somewhere between these two extremes of an inviolable right
29 126 Misc. 829, 832, 215 N. Y. Supp. 159, 162 (1926). The leading
cases on the point are collected at 831, 215 N. Y. Supp. at 161.
30 But cf. Re Troy Auto Car Co., Pub. Util. Rep. 1917A 700 (N. Y. 1917).
31 The question is of more than academic interest since the New York
statute does not seem to contain the usual broad and specific power to
revoke.
32 See Burgess v. Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 126 N. E. 456 (1920); Fochee
v. State, 15 Ala. App. 113, 72 So. 685 (1916) ; Chicago v. Gall, 195 Ill. App.
41 (1915); LaPlante v. State Board, 131 Atl. 641 (R. I. 1926).
83 Supra note 32, at 101, 126 N. E. at 460.
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and a mere permission, stands the certificate of convenience
and necessity. It seems safe to prophecy that as the bus com-
panies become more and more stable, their investment greater,-
their service more regular and their good will highly important,
certificates will come to be treated in most respects as rights of
substance, subject to full protection as property, and revohable
only by the strict terms of their issuance. The decisions certainly
indicate a rapid trend in that direction.2 5
THE ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATES
The requirement of a certificate from the commission as a
condition precedent to operation as a motor carrier is usually
to be found in the statute which vests jurisdiction over such
carriers in the commission. Such statutes not infrequently pre-
scribe the form of application which must be made to the com-
mission, and require a hearing to be had thereon after notice has
been given to interested parties, who may intervene.-" Some
general public utility acts require all enterprises under the act
to secure such certificates before beginning operation, or before
extensions are made; hence where motor carriers have been
brought under commission regulation by legislative re-definition,
or by commission construction of the terms "common carrier"
and "public utility," certificates have been required of them.31
Recently the Arkansas commission assumed jurisdiction of motor
34A computation made by Merrill B. Knox, Esq., assistant editor of B%-i
TRANSPORTATION, from financial balance sheets and other Eourczs indi-
cates that as of June 1, 1926, the capital investment in the passenger
motor carrier industry was $743,22S,181. Of this sum -422,505,181 is
represented by common carrier companies. These figurcs include not only
rolling stock but also equipment, including terminal and garage facilities.
The valuation of the steam railroads of the country is estimated to be
between 15 and 30 billions of dollars.
35 See discussion infra, especially of enforcement of certificates by holderz.
36 For examples of statutes prescribing the manner of application, see:
Kan. Laws 1925, c. 206, § 4; Blinn. Laws 1925, c. 185, § 5(b); N. C. Laws
1925, c. 50, § 3(a); S. D. Laws 1925, c. 224, §§ 8(b), 9(b).
For examples of provisions specifically requiring commission hearings
upon applications, see: Conn. Pub. Acts 1921, c. 77, § 3; Ind. Acts 1925, C.
46, § 2; Iowa Acts 1925, c. 5, § 5; Kan. Laws 1925, c. 206, § 4; Ky. Act of
March 5, 1926, § 14; N. C. Laws 1925, c. 50, § 3(b) (c). But cf. Wash.
Laws 1921, c. 111, § 4, and 1 Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1920) § 614-S7.
For examples of provisions requiring notice of a hearing to be served
on interested parties, as competing rail carriers, local authorities, etc., who
may intervene and present evidence, see Ky. Act of March 5, 192G, § 14;
Minn. Laws 1925, c. 185, § 6; 1 Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1920) §G14-91;
Vt Laws 1925, No. 74, § 2.
3 See, for examples: Colo. Comp. Laws (1921) § 2914; Ill. Rev. StaL.
(Cahill, 1923) c. lla, § 71; Pa. Stat. (West, 1920) §§ 18088, 18150; Wyo.
Comp. Stat. (1920) § 5497.
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carriers under the general language "common carrier," and re-
quired certificates of convenience before operation, although the
public utilities act under which it proceeded lays down no such
requirement for any public utilities.38 The Supreme Court has
just held, however, that the statute does not sustain this as-
sumption of jurisdiction.39
It is of the essence of a certificate of public convenience and
necessity that its issuance lies within the discretion of a commis-
sion. A statute which requires the issuance of a "permit"
as a matter of right, if the operator complies with certain defined
conditions, is not the kind of certificate we have here under con-
sideration. The permits required in Oregon and Idaho seem to
be of this variety.40 The model uniform statute, prepared in
1923 by the motor vehicle committee of the National Association
of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners, made provision for such
"permit" to a limited class of operators, those not on a regular
schedule between fixed termini.41 Some such scheme is employed
in a few states, either by statute or by commission regulation,'
4
and the proposed federal regulatory measure adopted the classifi-
cation method for interstate carriers.43 The general rule is,
however, that all carriers which are regulated at all, are required
to obtain the same authorization; not a mere registration,
but a certificate that public convenience and necessity require
the operation.
CLASSES OF CARRIERS OF WHOM CERTIFICATES ARE REQUIRED
To what kinds of motor carriers does the requirement extend?
Upon this question there is great diversity in the statutes, the
88 In Re the Petition of the Arkansas Traveler Company for Establish-
ment of Rules & Regulations governing Common Carriers of Passengers
by Bus between Cities within the State of Arkansas, Case No. 507, Dec.
15, 1925, amended March 26, 1926, same case number. Jurisdiction was
assumed by virtue of. Ark. Acts 1921, Act 124, § 5.
39 Arkansas R. R. Comm. v. Independent Bus Lines, 285 S. W. 388 (Ark.
1926). McCulloch, C. 3., and Wood, J., dissented.
40 Or. Laws (Spec. Sess.) 1921, c. 10, § 4, provides for a permit which
must be issued to all applicants who will comply with certain simple re-
quirements; this statute was replaced in 1925 by a comprehensive law pro-
viding for genuine discretionary permits, but its effect was suspended
until a referendum in November, 1926. See also Idaho Laws 1925, c.
197, § 4.
41 See 35 NAT'L Ass'N OF R. R. AND UTILITIES CO1MISSIONERS (Proceed-
ings 35th Annual Convention, 1923) 177 et seq.
42 See S. C. Acts 1925, No. 170, §§ 2, 4 (five classes); S. D. Laws 1925,
c. 224, § 10 (four classes) ; Va. Acts 1924, c. 222, §§ 3, 5 (a) (four classes) ;
and see Case No. 507, Railroad Commission of Arkansas, Amendment to
Order, March 26, 1926 (three classes).
43 See S. 1734, a bill to regulate interstate commerce by motor vehicles
operating as common carriers on the public highways, 69th Cong. 1st Sess.
For further discussion of this measure see infra page 180.
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,differences turning principally upon four factors: (1) the uses
to which the carrier is put; (2) whether carriage is regular and
between fixed termini, or irregular; (3) whether the operation
is as a common carrier or a private carrier; (4) the geographical
extent of operation.
(1) Exemptions from the operation of acts requiring certifi-
cates are frequently extended on the basis of the use to which
the carrier puts his facilities. Such exemption sometimes ex-
tends to all freight carriers, as in New York and Massa-
chusetts; -4 other common exemptions include taxi-cabs," hotel
and sightseeing busses,," school and church bussesI T and carriers
transporting agricultural or dairy products to market from the
point of production. s The majority of these exemptions have
44 N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 64, §§ 25, 26, as construed by the
commission in Re Graves, No. 7562 (2d Dist.) decided June 15, 1926;
Iass. Acts 1925, c. 280.
45 Calif. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1923) Act 5129, § 1; Ky. Act of March 5,
1926, § 27a; La. Act of July 15, 1926, § 1 (f) ; Blinn. Laws 1925, c. 185, §
2(f); Mliss. Laws 1926, c. 128, §§ 3(f), 3(h); Nev. Laws 1925, c. 161, § 1;
N. J. Laws 1926, c. 144, § 2, c. 146, § 2; N. D. Laws 1925, c. 91, § 1 (D);
I Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1926) § 614-84 (a); Or. Gen. Laws. (Spec. Sess.)
1921, c. 10, § 1 (c); Va. Acts 1924, c. 222, § 9; Wyo. Laws 1925, c. 150.
Some states expressly. include taxicabs. Md. Acts 1920, c. 677; W. Va.
Code (Barnes, 1925) c. 43, § 82. In those states regulating irregular opera-
tors, taxicabs would be subjected to regulation, unless the state commis-
sion has no authority over carriers exclusively within cities. _New Jerzey
has just enacted a special taxicab act, N. J. Laws 1926, c. 249. See infra
note 54.
46 Calif. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1923) Act 5129, § 1; Ky. Act of March 5,
1926, § 27a; N. C. Laws 1925, c. 50, § 2; 1 Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1926) §
614-84a; S. C. Acts 1925, No. 170, § 2; Va. Acts 1924, e. 222, § 2 deal
with sightseeing busses. As to hotel busses, see Blinn. Laws 1925, e. 185, §
2 (f); Nev. Laws 1925, c. 161, § 1; N. J. Laws 1926, c. 144, § 2; 1 Ohio
Gen. Code (Page, 1926) § 614--84a; N. D. Laws 1925, c. 91, § 1 (D). For
an interesting case involving the status of such carriers, see Chicago Motor
Coach Co. v. Edgewater Beach Hotel, 5 Ill. Commerce Comm. 649 (1926).
As of Jan. 1, 1926, there were 2,520 busses operating in these two classifi-
.cations. Loomis, op. cit. supra note 1, at 71.
47 Idaho Laws 1925, c. 197, § 1; Iowa Acts 1925, c. 5, § 1 (a) ; Ran. Laws
1925, c. 206, § 1 (d) ; La. Act of July 15, 1926, § 1 (f) ; Blinn. Laws 1925,
c. 185, § 2 (f); Miss. Laws 1926, c. 128, § 3; N. J. Laws 1926, c. 144, § 2, c.
146, § 2;N. C. Laws 1925, c. 50, § 2; N. D. Laws 1925, c. 91, § 1 (D) ; 1 Ohio
Gen Code (Page, 1926) § 614-84a; S. C. Acts 1925, No. 170, § 2; S. D. Laws
1925, c. 224, § 1 (i); Va. Acts 1924, c. 222, § 2.
It is estimated that 500,000 students daily use motor carriers in regular
school service. See Covert, Schools Sp02d $10,000,000 Yearly To Trazport
Pupils (1926) 5 Bus TRANSPORTATION, 175.
48 Calif. Gen. ,Laws (Deering, 1923) Act 5129, § 5; Kan. Laws 1925, c.
206, § 1 (d); Minn. Laws 1925, c. 185, § 2 (f); Mont. Laws 1923, c. 154,
§ 1 (e); Mliss. Laws 1926, c. 128, § 3; N. C. Laws 1925, c. 50, 5 2; N. D.
Laws 1925, c. 91, § 1 (D); Or. Gen. Laws (Spec. Sess.) 1921, c. 10, § 1 (e);
S. C. Acts 1925, No. 170, § 2; S. D. Laws 1925, c. 224, § 1 (i); Va. Acts
1924, c. 222, § 2. In Montana and Oregon it is provided that the commis-
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been sustained by the courts against charges of arbitrary and un-
reasonable classification.
4 9
(2) The regulation of motor carriers that do not operate over
a regular route and between fixed termini presents serious diffi-
culties of administration to the commissions." Accordingly,
many statutes exclude them from the regulation through certifi-
cates imposed upon regular operators, either by limiting the ap-
plication of the statute to such regular operators, or by requir-
ing certificates of convenience and necessity of regular operators
and some different form of authorization for irregular oper-
ators.51 Similar distinctions have been made by commissions,
even where the statute contains no such limitation.2
sion may exempt "the transportation of freight or passengers by motor
vehicle in rural communities when not done on a commercial basis."
The reasons for this exemption are given by Mr. Kuykendall, who wa'i
then Director of Public Works of Washington, 35 NAT'L Ass'N OF R. R.
AND UTILITIES COMMISSIONERS, supra note 41, at 183 and 166.
49 See State v. Johnson, 243 Pac. 1073 (Mont. 1926) ; Smallwood v. Jeter,
244 Pac. 149 (Idaho, 1926) and such analogous cases as Ex parte Hoffert,
34 S. D. 271, 148 N. W. 20 (1914); Thielke v. Albee, 79 Or. 48, 153 Pac.
793 (1916); Bacon Service Corp. v. Huss, 248 Pac. 235 (Calif. 1926).
But some of the exemptions have been held arbitrary. See State v.
Crosson, 33 Idaho, 140, 190 Pac. 922 (1923); Franchise Motor Freight
Ass'n v. Seavey, 235 Pac. 1000 (Calif. 1925).
60 "The original auto transportation acts in several states undertook the
regulation of companies operating between fixed termini or over a regular
route only. Practical experience has disclosed that freight trucks and for-
hire passenger cars, maintaining stands in the various cities and towns,
are operating over the routes covered by the certificates of convenience
and necessity issued to the auto transportation companies and are keenly
competitive therewith. The major portion of the service performed by these
concerns consists of freight tranfer business and passenger taxicab opera-
tions in the various towns and cities; but, when opportunity presents itself,
these companies transport persons and property between towns, cities and
localities over routes covered by certificates of convenience and necessity.
These independent operators do not come within the purview of most of the
regulatory acts. . . . They escape all regulation. . . . They fre-
quently engage in cut-throat competition with each other and with certifi-
cate holders to their own detriment and to the injury of regular certified
operators and ultimately to the detriment of public service." '5 NAjr'l,
Ass'N OF R. R. AND UTILITIES COMMISSIONERS, supra note 41, at 164.
51 Calif. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1923) Act 5129, § 1 (c); 3 Colo. Ann. Stat.
(Courtright's Mill's, 1924) § 5933r; Conn. Pub. Acts 1921, c. 77, § 1; Iowa
Acts 1925, c. 5, § 1 (a); Ky. Act of March 5, 1926, §§ 3, 21, 21a; Me. Laws
1923, c. 211, § 1; Md. Ann. Code (Bagby, 1924) art. 56, §§ 255, 262, semblc;
Mlass. Acts 1925, c. 280, § 1; Mich. Pub. Acts 1923, No. 209, § 1; Minn.
Laws 1925, c. 185, §§ 1, 2; Miss. Laws 1926, c. 128, §§ 3 (h), 5 (distinction
in degree of regulation only); Mont. Laws 1923, c. 154, § 1 (c) ; N. J. Laws
1926, c. 144, § 2; Okla. Laws 1923, c. 113, §1 (b); Vt. Laws 1925, No. 74,
§ 1; Wash. Laws 1921, c. 111, § 1 (d).
52 See Ark. Railroad Comm., Case No. 507, as amended March 26, 1926;
Ill. Commerce Comm., General Order 116, June 4, 1924, rule 1; Or. Pub.
Serv. Comm., Order 1297, effective Jan. 1, 1926.
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Not the least difficult task in administering motor carrier laws
lies in the interpretation of these terms "regular routes" and
"fixed termini" A typical instance is People v. Car,. ' The
defendants operated taxi-cabs from the railroad station at Mus-
kegon, and solicited passengers to go to Hart, a neighboring city.
On the return trip they would transport anyone who wished to
go from Hart to Muskegon. Ordinarily a taxi-cab does not oper-
ate over a regular route and between fixed termini." In the opin-
ion of the court there was nothing illegal in the defendants' oper-
ating frequently between the two cities, upon the request of
patrons; they "could not, however, establish a service between
Hart and Muskegon, or elsewhere, under schedule, or even inter-
mittent, for the purpose of rendering a general auto bus service
to the public, in competition with the auto bus service under state
regulation, without a permit to do so from the Commission." r
Upon a consideration of the facts it appeared that defendants
were actually operating regularly, hence illegally.
(3) Whether existing statutes and commission orders require
certificates of convenience and necessity of pdi-iatc carriers, that
is, those who do not offer their services to the public at large
indiscriminately to the limit of their capacity, presents a d;ffi-
cult question, not only of administration but also of constitu-
tional law. A company serving all comers must first secure a
certificate and be subject to commission regulation. If another
company performing identical service over the same route, but
as a "private" carrier under special contract with one or more
patrons, may operate without such certificate, and in unregulated
competition with such certified carriers, a real strain is put upon
the entire regulatory scheme. The same considerations which
led the legislatures to require certificates of common carriers
apply with almost equal force to private carriers for 1 ire:
there is the same injury to the highway due to over-crowding,
the same hazard to pedestrian and riding public, the same de-
structioli of sound and continuous service through unrestricted
competition. Accordingly, many state statutes have employed
53 231 Mich. 246, 206 N. W. 948 (1925).
54 See Schnader, The Ta:xcat--Its SCo'CiCC ead Rcgide' (192 ) 11
ANNALS OF THE ABIER. AC.AD. OF POLITICAL AND ScIL SClINCu, 101.
55 People v. Carr, supra note 53, at 249, 206 N. W. at 949.
56 "Upon principle, however, we perceive no reason why the rule should
not apply with equal force to the case of a private carrier who proposes to,
use the street as a place of private business or as a chief instrumentality
thereof. The rule does not rest upon the circumstance alone that the
carrier is engaged in operating a public utility and that his busines is
therefore affected with a public interest, but it rests equally upon the
circumstance that he is using the public highways as the chief instru-
mentality of a private businezs conducted for private gain. In other words,
he is enjoying a special privilege in the highways which are constructed
17/5
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language broad enough to include private carriers within their
requirements of certificates," and some of the commissions have
construed the statutory language to include such carriers. The
Michigan commission, for example, made such a construction,
and a private carrier sought and was granted an injunction
against the commission, restraining it from enforcing the Act
(which included a provision requiring certificates of conven-
ience) against the complainant. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court
of the United States, in Public Utilities Commission v. Duke,"
affirmed the decree of the lower court, and held invalid that
section of the act which declared all motor carriers for hire to
be common carriers, subject to common carrier regulation. The
court did not hold, however, that a state could not constitution-
ally require certificates of convenience of private carriers,
although at least one state court subsequently so misconstrued
the decision. 9 The holding of the court is summed up in the
following statement:
"It is beyond the power of the state by legislative fiat to con-
vert property used exclusively in the business of a private
carrier into a public utility or to make the owner a public
carrier, for that would be taking property for public use with-
and maintained at public expense and designated for the common use of
all." Frost v. Railroad Comm. of California, 240 Pac. 26, 29 (Calif. 1926).
57 In the following states, regulation extends to all motor vehicles upon
the highways operating "for hire" or "for compensation": Idaho Laws 1925,
c. 197, § 1; Me. Laws 1923, c. 211, § 1; Mass. Acts 1925, c. 280, § 1, adding
"as a business . . ."; N. C. Laws 1925,,c. 50; N. D. Laws 1925, c. 91, §
1 (D); Okla. Laws 1923, c. 113, § 1 (b); Wash. Laws 1921, c. 111, §§ 1 (d),
2; W. Va. Code (Barnes, 1925) c. 43, § 82 (h); Wyo. Laws 1925, c. 150.
The phrase "in the business of transporting persons or property . . .
or as a common carrier for compensation . . " is used in Calif. Gen.
Laws (Deering, 1923) Act 5129, § 1; Mont. Laws 1923, c. 154, § 1 (c);
Or. Gen. Laws (Spec. Sess.) 1921, c. 10, § 1 (c). A similar phrase is used
in the new Kentucky statute, Act of March 5, 1926, § 1. Indiana and Ohio
expressly exclude private carriers. Ind. Acts 1925, c. 46, § 5. See also S. C.
Acts 1925, No. 170, § 4; S. D. Laws 1925, c. 224, § 2 (a); Va. Acts 1924, c.
222, § 3. The statutory situation in Ohio is worthy of special note. Section
614-84 of the Code (Page, 1926) applies the Act to "common carriers for
hire, under private contract or for the public in, general" but not to
"private contract carriers." Section 614-2 defines the latter as motor
vehicles "under private contract but not as common carriers" to which
carriers alone the Act as a whole applies. The same section defines "motor
transportation companies" as motors operating "under private contract or
for the public in general . . " as common carriers. The Act of 1923
was construed in Hissem v. Guran, 112 Ohio St. 59, 146 N. E. 808 (1925)
to exclude private carriers upon the authority of Michigan Pub. Util.
Comm. v. Duke, 266"U. S. 570, 45 Sup. Ct. 191 (1925). Hence the Act was
amended in 1925 by inserting "under private contract" as a clause of
exclusion.
5s Supra note 57.
59 Hissem v. Guran, supra note 57.
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out just compensation, which no state can do consistently with
the due process of law clause of the 14th Amendment." c" But
the court did not hold that requiring a certificate of convenience
of a private carrier violated the due process of law clause. Nor
can it be said that requiring such a certificate as a condition
precedent to the operation of a private carrier "convert[s] prop-
erty used exclusively in the business of private carrier into
a public utility or . make[s] the owner a public carrier,"
a legislative metamorphosis which the court did hold violated
the due process clause.
The California commission had likewise required certificates
of private carriers; an appeal from the commission's order was
presented to the California Supreme Court after the decision
in the Duke case. This court upheld the commission, but in
the opinion wandered afield from the points necessarily raised
by the appeal.01 Mr. Chief Justice Meyers stated that the same
obligations which could constitutionally be imposed upon com-
mon carriers, might be imposed upon private carriers for hire.
"Upon principle," he continued, "we perceive no reason why the
rule should not apply with equal force to the case of a private
carrier. . . . The rule does not rest upon the circumstance
alone that the carrier is engaged in operating a public utility
and that his business is therefore affected with a public interest,
but it rests equally upon the circumstance that he is using the
public highways as the chief instrumentality of a private busi-
ness conducted for private gain. In other words he is en-
joying a special privilege in the highways which are con-
structed and maintained at public expense and designated for
the common use of all." Although the commission's order could
have been affirmed without treading upon such uncertain
ground, the court said that the state could require that all car-
riers using the highways for business purposes should be sub-
ject to all common carrier duties and regulations. But the
requirement of a certificate of a private carrier (which is what
the commission had ordered) does not, of course, necessarily
effect any such radical result.1'2
In Frost v. Railroad Co~mnission of Califoriana,c3 the United
6o Supra note 58, at 577, 45 Sup. Ct. at 193.
C1 The only issue was whether the commission's desisting order should
have been sustained. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in
Frost v. Railroad Comm., 46 Sup. Ct. 605, 610 (U. S. 192G).
62The California court sought to distinguish the Duke case on the ground
that the contracts had been entered into before the enactment of the legic-
lation in question, so that subsequent regulatory legislation impaired thoZe
contracts, whereas in the Frost case the legislation was in effect when the
contracts were made. There is nothing in the Dulze opinion to sustain this
distinction.
C Supra note 61.
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States Supreme Court, in its most recent pronouncement in
this field, reversed the California judgment. The court con-
demned the assumption of the California court that a private
carrier can, as a condition of operation upon the highways, be
required to submit to common carrier obligations, and stated
that this is simply one way of converting a private carrier
into a common carrier by legislative command, a result for-
bidden by the due process clause. But the court did not hold
that the states may not require certificates of private carriers.
"The case presented," wrote Mr. Justice Sutherland, for the
majority, "is not that of a private carrier, who, in order to
have the privilege of using the highways is required merely
to secure a certificate of public convenience and become subject
to regulations appropriate to that kind of carrier, but it is that
of a private carrier, who, . . . must submit to the con-
dition of becoming a common carrier. . . ." There is here
no holding that private carriers may not be constitutionally
certified, without violence to the Constitution; in fact, the in-
ference is to the contrary. 4 The holding is simply that private
carriers may not be so regulated, whatever the means, as to
convert them from private into common carriers, subject to
all those common law and statutory obligations of continuity
and equality of service, etc., to which common carriers must
submit.
(4) The geographical extent of a carrier's operations has
been made a basis for exemption or inclusion in the class from
which a certificate is exacted. For example, the statutes in
some states do not require those motor carriers to obtain a
certificate whose operation is wholly within a city, or between
contiguous cities; 65 hence only inter-city operators must pass
the "public convenience and necessity" test. Even in states
64 The opinion of the dissenting judges is explicit upon the point.
65This provision is found in Calif. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1923)
Act 5129, § 5, but cf. § 4; Idaho Laws 1925, c. 197; Ill. Rev. Stat. (Cahill,
1923) c. lila, § 100 (if cities accept jurisdiction by referendum); Ind.
Laws 1925, c. 46, § 5 (subject to conditions) ; Kan. Laws 1925, c. 206, § 1
(d) ; Ky. Act of March 5, 1926, § 27a (as to streets not maintained in whole
or part by other than local funds); Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 159, § 47
(with appeal to state authority); Mich. Pub. Acts 1923, No. 209, §§ 1, 8;
Mont. Laws 1923, c. 154, §§ 1 (c), 3; Nev. Laws 1925, c. 161, § 1; N. J.
Laws 1926, c. 144, § 2, but cf. Laws 1911, c. 195, § 24; New York Cons.
Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 64, § 25, c. 49, § 5 (1), c. 64, § 26, c. 27, § 288;
N. C. Pub. Laws 1925, c. 50; N. D. Laws 1925, c. 91, § 1 (d); 1 Ohio Gen.
Code (Page, 1926) § 614-84 (and including territory contiguous to munici-
pality); Okla. Laws 1923, c. 113, § 2; Or. Gen. Laws (Spec. Sess.) 1921,
c. 10, § 1 (c); S. D. Laws 1925, c. 224, § 1 (i); Va. Laws 1924, c. 222, § 9;
Va. Laws 1923, § 3712; Wash. Laws 1923, c. 79, § 1 (d); Miss. Laws 1926,
c. 128, §§ 3 (b), (h), 18. See also Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St.
245, 140 N. E. 595 (1923) ; Red Star Motor Drivers Ass'n v. Public Utilities
Comm., 209 N. W. 146 (Mich. 1926).
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in which all motor carriers, regardless of the region in which
they operate, must obtain certificates, municipalities often have
wide powers of regulation over such matters as speed, equip-
ment, routes and the like. In some states as in ]Iassachusetts
and New York the consent of the municipalities through which
an operator proceeds is a condition precedent to the issuance
of a certificate for the entire route by the commission.
In the absence of federal regulation of motor carriers operat-
ing in interstate commerce, the states for years sought to ex-
ercise some measure of control over such carriers, yet without
violation of the commerce clause. It was generally believed by
the commissions that with Congress "silent," ,7 the states might
require certificates of interstate carriers to safeguard their high-
ways and particularly to prevent the wrecking of intea- and
interstate motor carriage alike by cut-throat competition. In
requiring certificates of such carriers, and imposing other regu-
lations, the commissions and the courts supporting them relied
upon a line of Supreme Court decisions approving the imposition
upon interstate motor carriers of state license taxes, drivers'
licenses, and registration for service of processPcs But in two
recent decisions the United States Supreme Court has held that
the denial by a state of certificates of convenience and necessity
to exclusively interstate carriers is an undue and unreasonable
burden upon interstate commerce."3 Such certificates are not
in the nature of "police" regulations, but prohibit or limit the
right to operate in interstate commerce, and such result the
states are powerless to effect, under the commerce clause, despite
the "silence" of Congress. In the previously decided Dz.lec case
the commerce clause was also involved, but the court did not
66 See Mass. Acts 1925, c. 230, but cf. Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 159,
§ 47. The 1926 legislature amended the statute so that a single city along
a route cannot, by -withholding its consent, prevent the Department of
Public Utilities from issuing a certificate if the other cities have given
their consent. Cf. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. v. Public Utilities Comm., 77
Colo. 42, 234 Pac. 175 (1925) ; Norfolk Southern Ry. v. Commonwealth, 141
Va. 179, 126 S. E. 32 (1925) ; N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 64, § 25,
c. 49, § 5 (1); N. J. Laws 1926, c. 144, § 2, but cf. N. J. Laws 1911, c.
195, § 24; N. J. Laws 1926, c, 44, § 3, and c. 146, § 2; Utah Comp. Stat.
(1917) § 4818; Wash. Comp. Stat. (Remington, 1922) § 6382 (as to fir-t-
class cities); W. Va. Code (Barnes, 1925) c. 43; Wis. Stat. 1921), . 191.07.
67 Foranalysis of the decisions which indicate the extent to which -tate
regulation may go, where there is no federal action, see Frankfurter and
Landis, The Compact Cla se of the Constitzution (1925) 34 YA= LAw
JOURNAL, 685, 721 et seq.
6s Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35 Sup. Ct. 140 (1915); Kane v.
New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30 (1916). See also Smith v.
Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 564 (1883); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry.
v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96, 9 Sup. Ct. 28 (188).
69 Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307, 45 Sup. Ct. 324 (1925); Bush v.
Maloy, 267 U. S. 317, 45 Sup. Ct. 326 (1925).
YALE LAW JOURNAL
pass directly upon the constitutionality of state certification of
an interstate carrier.
These decisions at once produced no end of confusion.70 A
movement for a federal statute was at once set on foot, and a
legislative proposal to meet the situation was drafted and in-
troduced into Congress.71 Extended hearings were held on this
bill during the last session of Congress. Under its provisigns,
certificates of convenience are required of all interstate motor
common carriers. Jurisdiction to grant or deny certificates is
vested jointly in the commissions of the states through which
the carrier proposes to operate. It seems not unlikely that
legislation patterned in general along the lines of this bill will
be enacted within the next few sessions of Congress. Meanwhile
the states may require interstate operators carrying intrastate
as well as interstate passengers, to obtain certificates covering
the operation within the state, so long as such requirement does
not result in unreasonably burdening the interstate carriage.2
CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMISSIONS IN THE
ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATES
When a motor carrier makes application to a commission for
authority to operite, the commission must pass upon a difficult
question, and one predicated upon an economic problem: does
the public necessity and convenience require the commission to
authorize this additional transportation service? Applying this
indefinite test to a complex set of facts calls for the exercise
of administrative and business judgment of the highest order.
In many states, when motor carriers were first subjected to
c6mmi~sion regulation, the legislatures lightened their initial
burden by providing that carriers operating in good faith on
o In Illinois, for example, in 1925, before the Buck and Bush decisions,
there were 6 busses operating interstate; at the end of the year, following
those decisions, there were 121 so operating who held Illinois intrastate
certificates, and 125 others holding no certificates from any state. See
testimony of Chester Moore, Esq., executive vice-president, Illinois Motor
Transportation Association. Hearings before the Interstate Commerce Cown-
mission in Docket 18300, Motor Bus and Truck- Investigation, Chicago,
Illinois, July 28, 1926; see also a comment on the Rhode Island situation in
(1926) 5 Bus TRANSPORTATION, 52; Slater, op. cit. supra note 7, at 133;
Hearings before Interstate Commerce Committee on S. 1734, 69th Cong. 1st
Sess. 210.
71 The bill, known as S. 1734, was drafted by a special committee of the
National Ass'n of Ry. and Utilities Commissioners, headed by John E.
Benton, its general solicitor, and modified in conferences with the interests
represented by the Nat'l Automobile Chamber of Commerce, the Bus Di-
vision of the American Automobile Ass'n, the American Electric Ry Ass'n,
the Ass'n of Ry. Executives and the American Short Line Ry. Ass'n.
The details of this important proposal may be found in (1926) 26 CoL.
L. REv. 954.
72 Haselton v. Interstate Stage Lines, Inc., 133 Atl. 451 (N. H. 1926).
MOTOR CARRIER REGULATION
a certain date, generally prior to or at the date of the passage
of the motor regulation statute, upon filing an application and
proving affirmatively such operation, were entitled to certificates
as a matter of right. 3 The basis for such a provision, called
a "grand-father clause," is simply one of fairness-that a man
who has developed a useful business should not have it suddenly
taken from him; and the notion that if a carrier has been operat-
ing successfully, it is at least prhna fcie evidence that the
public necessity and convenience require him to continue.
The classification made between prior and subsequent bus
lines has been upheld as constitutional under the equal pro-
tection clause.74 The provision has been said to be a legislative
determination that the public convenience and necessity did not
require a curtailment of existing service, but only a regulation
and limitation of future service. Some statutes do not, how-
ever, make such a provision. They are not for this reason un-
constitutional."s
The certificates issued as a matter of right confer no superior
rights; their holders are subject to the same obligations as other
certificate holders. The right of operation granted by them is
limited to the existing route.0 Any change in route or addition
to service must be obtained through the usual procedure. T
It has been held that the right to a "grand-father clause"
certificate is personal in nature to the extent of being issuable
alone to the identical individual operating in good faith on the
date set by the legislature. It is not issuable to a partnership
or corporation formed by the original operator.7 But the courts
73 The following states provide for the issuance of a certificate as a
matter of right, upon the filing of an application coupled with an aidavit
setting out the fact of prior operation upon a date certain. Calif. Gen.
Laws (Deering, 1923) § 5; Ind. Laws 1925, c. 46, § 2; Kan. Laws 1925, c.
206, § 11; Ky. Act of March 5, 1926, § 7; La. Act of July 15, 1920, § 3;
Mass. Acts 1925, c. 280, § 4; Minn. Laws 1925, c. 185, § 10; Nev. Laws 1925,
c. 161, § 3; N. J. Laws 1921, c. 149, at 390; 1 Ohio Code (Page, 1920) C
614-87; S. C. Acts 1925, No. 170, § 3; S. D. Laws 1925, c. 224, § 14; Va.
Acts 1923, c. 161, § 3; Va. Acts 1924, c. 222, § 3; Wash. Laws 1921, c. 111.
74 Gruber v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 312, 125 S. E. 427 (1924); Sheets
Ta-cab Co. v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 325, 125 S. E. 431 (1924).
75 Motor Transit Co. v. Railroad Comm., 189 Calif. 573, 209 Pac. 5SG
(1922). The California statute now includes such a so-called "grand-
father clause"; see Calif. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1923) Act 5129, § 5. Cf.
People v. Hadley, 66 Calif. App. 370, 226 Pac. 336 (1924).
76 Sheets Taxcab Co. v. Commonwealth, supra note 74.
77 Motor Transit Co. v. Railroad Comm., supra note 75 (stopping at
intermediate points en route).
7s Westhoven v. Public Utilities Comm., 112 Ohio St. 411, 147 N. E. '159
(1925); Re Westmoreland, Pub. Util. Rep. 1918 C 318 (Calif. 1918);
Red Ball Transit Co. v. Public Utilities Conmm., 112 Ohio St. 462, 147 N. E.
762 (1925).
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of Virginia have held otherwise, upon broad grounds of prin-
ciple .7
Statutes frequently provide that no certificate shall be
granted by the commission until certain conditions have been
met, such as the filing of indemnity bonds or insurance, incor-
poration of the carrier, the consent of the municipalities upon
the route, and like conditions.8 0 Of course, until such conditions
have been met, no valid certificate can be issued.,"
Assuming, however, that an application for a certificate is
filed with a commission; that all preliminary conditions have
been satisfied; and that the applicant is not entitled to a certifi-
cate as a matter of right, by what standard is the commission
to determine whether the public convenience and necessity will
79 They have said that the reasoning behind allowing existing carriers to
operate was that existing service did not crowd the roads and could be
maintained without injury to the public or the carrier. It makes no differ-
ence to the public if the individual operating takes on new associates.
Besides, if the certificate were granted it would be impossible to prevent
the individual from forming indirect associations to effect his purpose.
Carroll v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 305, 125 S. E. 433 (1924); Bowman v.
Commonwealth, 140 Va. 299, 125 S. E. 435 (1924).
Under either one of these lines of decisions, the person engaged in prior
operation must be an applicant or associated with the applicant.
8o Bonds or indemnity insurance are required by the following statutes:
Ariz. Laws 1919, c. 130, § 7; Conn. Pub. Acts 1921, c. 340; Idaho Laws
1925, c. 197, § 3; Ill. Rev. Stat. (Cahill, 1923) c. llla, §§ 72, 73, 74, c. 96a,
§§ 44-47; Ind. Laws 1925, c. 46, § 3; Iowa Acts 1925, c. 5, § 12; Kan. Laws
1925, c. 206, § 7; Ky. Act of March 5, 1926, § 38a; La. Act of July 15, 1926,
§ 6; Me. Laws 1925, c. 167, § 14; Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 159, § 46, as
amended by Mass. Acts 1925, c. 346, § 7; Mich. Pub. Acts 1923, No. 209, §
7; Minn. Laws 1925, c. 185, § 11; Miss. Laws 1926, c. 128, § 11; Mont. Laws
1923, c. 154, § 6; Nev. Laws 1925, c. 161, § 2; N. H. Laws 1919, c. 86, § 2;
N. J. Laws 1926, c. 144, § 3, c. 231, § 2; N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1925
Supp.) c. 27, § 282b; N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 64, § 26;
N. C. Laws 1925, c. 50, § 3 (g); N. D. Laws 1925, c. 91, § 9;
1 Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1926) § 614-99; Okla. Laws 1923, c. 113, § 7;
Okla. Laws (Spec. Sess.) 1924, c. 105; Or. Laws (Spec. Sess.) 1921, c. 10,
§ 6; Or. Laws 1921, c. 402; R. I. Gen. Laws 1923, §§ 3734, 3735; S. C. Acts
1925, No. 170, §§ 5, 18; S. D. Laws 1925, c. 224, §§ 15, 16; Utah Laws 1925,
c. 114; Vt. Pub. Acts 1925, No. 73, at 113, No. 72, at 112; Va. Laws 1924,
c. 222, § 4; Wash. Laws 1921, c. 111, § 5; W. Va. Ann. Code (Barnes, 1925)
c. 43, § 82; Wis. Stats. 1925, § 194.02 (3).
As to local consent, see supra note 65.
81 Not infrequently there is a specific legislative direction making rele-
vant the character of the applicant and his ability, financial or otherwise,
to render the best kind of service. See Iowa Laws 1925, c. 5, § 5 (applicant
must show financial ability to carry out the service proposed); Kan. Laws
1925, c. 206, § 4 (whether permanent or all-year-round a factor); La. Act
of July 15, 1926, § 3 (financial ability and good faith to be considered);
Minn. Laws 1925, c. 185, § 8 (permanency a factor); Mliss. Laws 1926,
c. 128, § 8 (permanency and continuity are to be considered); S. D. Laws
1925, c. 224, § 10 (continuity a factor), § 14 (financial capacity a factor);
Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1920) § 5497 (financial ability a factor).
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be best served by granting or denying the applicationT-2 Is
the public interest served by competition between the new agency
and the old regime-the rail carriers by steam or electricity?
Is it in the public interest to allow competition between motor
carriers? Is the "public," whose convenience and needs are
in question, the individuals immediately concerned along the
proposed route, or is the public at large meant? When is ad-
ditional transportation a "convenience" ? Is it a "necessity"
when other agencies are available? These and similar problems
have been perplexing the commissions and reviewing courts.
Whether competition between public carriers best serves the
public need for continuous, efficient and economical transpor-
tation, is at bottom a question of public policy; it is appropriate
that the legislature formulate that policy in the motor carrier
82The vital meaning of the phrase "public convenience and necessity"
must, of course, be sought in concrete applications of the test by courts and
commissions. The following effort at definition, from Wabash fly. v.
Commerce Comm., 309 Ill. 412, 418, 141 N. E. 212, 214 (1923) is, however,
not without interest:
"When the statute requires a certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity as a prerequisite to the construction or extension of any public utility,
the word 'necessity' is not used in its lexicographical sense of lindiz-
pensably requisite.' If it were, no certificate of public convenience and
necessity could ever be granted. The first telephone was not a public
necessity under such a definition, nor was the first electric light. Even the
construction of a waterworks system in a village is seldom necessary though
highly desirable. However, any improvement which is highly important
to the public convenience and desirable for the public welfare may ba re-
garded as necessary. If it is of sufficient importance to warrant the ex-
pense of making it, it is a public necessity. (Parh and Boul v ad Comn. v.
Moesta, 91 Mich. 149.) A thing which is ex-,pedient is a necessity. (War-
den v. Madisonville, Henderson and Evansville Railroad Co. 128 Ky. 563.)
Inconvenience may be so great as to amount to necessity. (Lawtien v.
Rives, 2 McCore L. 445.) A strong or urgent reason why a thing zhould
be done creates a necessity for doing it. (Todd v. Flourncy, 56 Ala. 99.)
The word connotes different degrees of necessity. It sometimes means in-
dispensable; at others needful, requisite or conducive. It is relative rather
than absolute. No definition can be given that would fit all statutes. The
meaning must be ascertained by reference to the context and to the objects
and purposes of the statute in which it is found. (Wiconsn Telcphone
Co. v. Railroad Corn. 162 Wis. 383.) The Commerce Commission has a
right to, and should, look to the future as well as to the present situation.
Public utilities are expected to provide for the public necessities not only
to-day but to anticipate for all future developments reasonably to b2 fore-
seen. The necessity to be provided for is not only the existing urgent need
but the need to be expected in the future, so far as it may be anticipated
from the development of the community, the growth of industry, the in-
crease in wealth and population and all the elements to be expected in
the progress of a community."
See also the famous discussion of the constitutional phrase "ncessary
and proper" by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 W.hcat.
316, 413 (U. S. 1819).
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statutes.83 In some of the more recent statutes such formulation
has been explicit and in considerable detail;84 in other states
the commission or reviewing courts have been able to spell out
what policy was intended by the legislature by a construction
of the whole public utility act; in others, the legislatures have
thrown the commissions upon their own responsibility.
A reading of these statutes is enough to convince one that
the day when vigorous competition between public utilities was
thought to further the public interest has gone. For example,
in the North Dakota Motor Carrier Act of 1925 it is provided
that in passing upon an application for a certificate the "Com-
mission shall give reasonable consideration to the transportation
service being furnished or that could be furnished by any rail-
road, and the effect which such proposed transportation service
may have upon other forms of transportation service which are
essential and indispensable to the communities to be affected by
such proposed transportation service, or that might be affected
thereby, and to the traffic already existing upon the route pro-
posed to be traveled. . . The Commission shall avoid as
far as possible, consistent with the public interest, the duplica-
tion of transportation service." Similar, though more concise
directions, requiring the commissions to consider all existing
transportation services in deliberating upon an application, are
to be found in the statutes of Kansas, Ohio, South Dakota, Wy-
oming, Kentucky, Colorado and West Virginia." The Virginia
statute, on the other hand, denies the commission the right to
refuse a certificate to class A carriers simply because of "the
existence of a railroad or other motor vehicle carriers in the
territory sought to be served," although it may be considered
as "a good cause for limiting the number of vehicles which
83 See Lilienthal, The Power of Governmental Agencies to Compel Testi-
mony (1926) 39 HARv. L. R.V. 694, 723 and notes 106, 107.
S4 See infra notes 85-90.
85 The Illinois statute contains no specific legislative declaration upon
this matter, unless it be the statement in § 55 that "no certificate . . .
shall be construed as granting a monopoly or an exclusive . . . fran-
chise." In setting aside an order granting a certificate to a bus line
competing with a street railway, the Illinois Supreme Court said:
"It is not the policy of the Public Utilities Act to promote competition
between common carriers as a means of providing service to the public.
The policy established by that act is that, through regulation of an estab-
lished carrier occupying a given field and protecting it from competition
it may be able to serve the public more efficiently and at a more reasonable
rate than would be the case if other competing lines were authorized to
serve the public in the same territory." West Suburban Transportation
Co. v. Chicago & W. T. Ry., 309 Ill. 87, 91, 140 N. E. 56, 58 (1923).
86 Kan. Laws 1925, c. 206, § 4; 1 Ohio Code (Page, 1926) § 614-87; S. D.
Laws 1925, c. 224, § 3; Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1920) § 5497; Ky. Act of March
5, 1926, § 4; Colo. Ann. Stat. (Courtright's Mill's, 1924) § 5933i (a);
W. Va. Ann. Code (Barnes, 1925) c. 43, § 82.
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such applicant may operate on the route." As to class B carriers,
the commission may not consider other transportation agencies
in the territory in any manner.67  And if an applicant other-
wise meets the standards of public good laid down by the law,
the Wisconsin commission must issue a certificate to him, "re-
gardless of any other service furnished." 88 A similar provision
is in the South Carolina Act of 1925.80 In both Montana and
North Dakota the commission is to give full consideration to
other transportation agencies, but a cautionary word that a
certificate is not to be deemed to establish a monopoly has been
inserted by legislatures who have behind them a tradition which
favors competition and frowns upon exclusive grants to public
utilities."
The decisions of the commissions and courts seem, on the
whole, consistent with such enactments, and in truth, with the
theory of all latter-day public utility regulation. Commissions
generally have sought to avoid duplication of service, with its
consequent economic waste; their first inquiry, even when not
so required by the statute under which they act, has been: is
the transportation service now rendered in the territory sought
to be served by this new motor carrier adequate to the needs
of that territory? If it is adequate, they have decided against
permitting a competitor to enter the field, with resulting duplica-
tion and impairment of the existing agency's ability to render
satisfactory service at a low rate.0 ' In considering whether the
service is adequate they have taken into consideration all forms
87Va. Acts 1924, c. 222, § 3.
88 Wis. Stat. 1925, § 194.02.
S9 S. C. Acts 1925, No. 170, § 4.
99 Mont. Laws 1923, c. 154, § 4; N. D. Laws 1925, c. 91, §§ 4, 5, S.
9' The following illustrative decisions of commissions throughout the
country contain discussions upon this point: Re Automobile Traffic, Pub.
Util. Rep. 1915 C 945, 952, 953 (Ariz. 1915); Re Bohn, Pub. Util. Rep. 1918
B 288, 291 (Ariz. 1917); Re International Auto Stage Line, Pub. Util.
Rep. 1925 A 428, 430 (Ariz. 1924) ; Re Mlotor Transit Company, Pub. Util.
Rep. 1922 D 495, 504 (Calif. 1922); Re United Stages, Pub. Util. Rep.
1925 A 688, 696 (Calif. 1924); Re City of Bridgeport, Pub. Util. Rep.
1922 B 193 (Conn. 1921) ; Re People's Mlotor Bus Company, Pub. Util. Rep.
1918 C 903, 904 (Ill. 1918); Re Kipp's Express Co., Pub. Util. Rep. 1923
E 250, 256 (Ill. 1923) ; Re Mlaine lotor Coaches, Inc., Pub. Util. Rep. 192G
B 545 (Mle. 1925) ; Re Dean, Pub. Util. Rep. 1920 C 972, 974 (Bld. 1920) ;
Re Anderson Bros., Pub. Util. Rep. 1922 D 750, 754 (Nev. 1922); Re
Blevins, Pub. Util. Rep. 1919 F 53, 62 (N. Y. 1919); Re Bingaman Motor
Express Company, Pub. Util. Rep. 1924 C 389, 392, 393 (Pa. 1924); Re
Flaugh, Pub. Util. Rep. 1924 D 862, 863 (Pa. 1924); Re Application to
Operate Jitneys, Pub. Util. Rep. 1922 E 612, 617 (R. I. 1922); Re Streeper,
Pub. Util. Rep. 1924 B 392 (Utah, 1923); Re Jewett & Son, Pub. Util. Rep.
1924 A 155 (Vt. 1923); Re Washington Rapid Transit Co., Pub. Util. Rep.
1923 B 328 (Wash. 1922); Re Jossey, Pub. Util. Rep. 1924 B 420, 425
(Wash. 1924).
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of transportation, including steam and electric railway and other
motor carriers . 2 Such a view seems sound, particularly in the
light of recent salutary efforts to co-ordinate motor and rail
transportation into a unit, with each facility rendering the
service most appropriate to it 3
But if existing service, whether by rail or motor, is shown
to be inadequate and unsatisfactory, or even if the riding public
shows a definite preference for motor over rail servicel' then the
public convenience and necessity requires that the application
be granted, even if the result is to cause great financial injury
to existing and long-established carriers, whose plants represent
92 See, for examples, McLain v. Public Utilities Comm., 110 Ohio St. 1,
12-13, 143 N. E. 381, 384 (1924); Allegheny Valley Street Railway v.
Greco, Pub. Util. Rep. 1917 A 723 (Pa. 1916); Petition of Gray, Pub. Util.
Rep. 1916 A 33 (N. Y. 1915); Re Wilson & Co., Pub. Util. Rep. 1920 C 635
(Calif. 1920); Re Motor Transit Co., Pub. Util. Rep. 1922 D 495 (Calif.
1922); Re North River Transportation Co., Pub. Util. Rep. 1925 D 812
(Wash. 1925); Eager v. Public Utilities Comm., 113 Ohio St. 604, 149
N. E. 865 (1925); Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 112
Ohio St. 699, 148 N. E. 921 (1925). See also the valuable note in (1926) 24
MICH. L. Rsv. 393; Slater, The Motor Bus as a Competitor of the Railroads
(1926) 2 JOURNAL OF LAND & PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS, 129. Compare
Rapid Railway v. Michigan Public Utilities Comm., 225 Mich. 426, 196
N. W. 518 (1923), in which the Michigan Supreme Court held that the
commission is limited in its inquiry concerning the extent of other trans-
portation facilities, to motor-vehicle rivals. Fellows, J., dissented in a
strong opinion which represents the general law.
93 See supra note 2. Note also such cases as Application of Illinois Power
& Light Corporation, 4 Ill. Commerce Comm. 40, 41 (1924); Illinois Com-
merce Comm. v. Zeda, Pub. Util. Rep. 1923 E 250, 256 (Ill. 1923);
Washington Ry. v. Washington Rapid Transit Co., Pub. Util. Rep. 1922 D
754 (D. C. 1922); Re Wyoming Valley Auto-Bus Co., Pub. Util. Rep. 1925
D 332 (Pa. 1925). See Ritchie, Go-ordination of Rail and Automobile
Transportation (1926) 67 McGRAW ELECTRIC RAILWAY MANUAL, 201; Reevel,
Co-ordination of Electric Railway and Bus Transportation (Nov. 1923)
AERA; Williams, The Motor Bus as an Adjunct to the Railroad (1923) 75
RAILWAY AGE, 1199; Emery, Buses or Railroad-or Both (Sept. 1926) AM.
REVIEW OF Ru.vmws. On February 27, 1926 the magazine RAILWAY AGE in-
augurated a Motor Transport Department. See the interesting dissent of
Chairman Atwill in Re New York, N. H. & H. R. R., Pub. Util. Rep. 1926
D 161, 163 (Mass. 1926).
94 In Re Troy Auto Car Company, Pub. Util. Rep. 1917 A 700, 704
(N. Y. 1926) the commission said: "It would seem, furthermore, that the
number of cars operated by the traction company in the competitive district
is sufficient to carry the traffic, and it would seem a priori that the street
car operation on a headway varying from five minutes to less than two
minutes would invite passengers away from automobile transportation on
a headway of fifteen minutes. . . . In spite of this theoretical con-
sideration, the fact confronts us that during fifteen months' operation of
the stage route its buses carried 770,852 passengers. This is an absolute
demonstration that many people of the neighborhood concerned regard the
stage route as a superior convenience."
See also Petition of Gray, Pub. Util. Rep. 1916 A 33 (N. Y. 1915).
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great investments. The commissions and courts can go so far
in attempting to prevent duplication and conserve e:xistn facil-
ities, that the entrepreneurs in the bus field will be forced out,
and the demand for the special Idnd of service they can furnish
be unjustly denied. If American transportation history can
serve as a guide, there should at first be considerable freedom
given to any new agency struggling to find a place in the gcneral
system of transport. 9
95 Blakeslee, C., in Re Aldrich, Pub. Util. Rp. 1923 A 3F5, "T0 ('. Y.
1922): "It is said that when the Erie Canal was projected, it was w-trnu-
ously opposed by those who hauled freight by ox-teams from Albany wczt-
ward, because the canal competition threatened to destroy their cAtablizhcd
business. When the first crude locomotive began to draw pazsenger and
freight cars, it undoubtedly meant ruinous competition to the lincs of
stage coaches. . . But . . . the competition of the established car-
rier had to yield to a more adequate and convenient method of tranprta-
tion."
The stage route companies, and turnpike and canal interests vigorously
opposed the building of railroads. See 'Eum ,AD um CG ImL, HISTORY
OF TnAsroRTATIoN IN THE UNITED STATES BErORE 1860 (191?) 317, 313;
CARTER, WHEN RAILROADS WERn NEW (1909) 27, 28, 181; and zee the report
of the Pennsylvania Board of Canal Commissioners of December, 1831.
On popular opposition to railroads, see Hill, Beginning of Boston and
Worcester Railroad (1902) ProCEEDINGS OF THE WORCcSTER SOcnrY Or
ANTIQUITY 1901, 527, 543; Lamb, Glimpses of The Railroad in Hi sto g
(1891) 25 AGAZINE OF AMERicAN HisRony, 430, 442.
The stand of the Illinois Supreme Court in the very recent case of
Egyptian Transportation Co. v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., supr, note 15,
seems unsound. There the commission had found that a certain territory
required frequent service, and that this the rail carriers had not been fur-
nishing. There was evidence that the only economical way in which the re-
quired service could be rendered was by motor bus, and that the railroad
was not operating busses. The commission accordingly grants d a eti~er.,'
to a reputable bus company. The Supreme Court set this order aside, hold-
ing that (p. 588) "it is the established policy of the law in this State that a
public utility be allowed to earn a fair return on its investments. It is
therefore not only unjust but poor economy to grant to a much les
responsible utility company the right to compete for the business of carry-
ing passengers by paralleling its line unless it appears that the necezzary
service cannot be furnished by such railroad." In other words, even where
service by rail is inadequate, and there is need for motor carriers, in-
dependent bus lines must not enter, if the railroads wih to opcrate bTi
themselves.
The view generally held, however, is that expressed by the Superior-
Court of Pennsylvania, in Pottsville Union Traction Co. v. Public Service
Comm., 67 Pa. Super. Ct. 301, 304 (1917) where the court said: "The
primary object of the public service laws is not to establish a monopoly or
guarantee the security of investment in public service corporations, but
first and at all time in the just exercise of its powers to serve the interests
of the public."
And in Re Colorado Motor Way, Inc., Pub. Util. Rep. 1924 A 50, 61
(Colo. 1923) the Colorado Commission said:
"It would seem to be time for railroad companies to understand that the
state does not guarantee a satisfactory return upon utility investments,
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A different problem arises when two or more motor carriers
apply for a single territory, where it is clear that one certificate
should be issued. The question becomes not one of determining
the effect of competition, but of deciding which applicant is
more likely to render the better service. The financial ability of
the applicants must be considered, under some statutes, and even
without such a provision the experience and reliability of the
operators will be considered.98 Very recently the existing rail
carriers have gone into the motor carrier business upon a large
scale, either directly or through subsidiaries ;9 the same weigh-
ing of advantages will take place when such a carrier seeks a
certificate in competition with a motor company applicant. In
Re Wyoming Valley Auto-Bus Company,8 the Pennsylvania pub-
lic service commission held that as between an independent bus
line and a bus subsidiary, auxiliary to a street railway corpo-
ration, the latter would be preferred. The commission stated
that the benefits of co-ordinated service available through the
subsidiary, and its superior financial resources were important
considerations. The Washington Department of Public Works
and further that the automobile is here to stay and that it cannot be elimi-
nated by any Utility Commission nor by any court or legislature; that It
is a great industrial fact and must be met and treated as such."
See also Re Aldrich, supra at 390, where it was said:
"This is a period of transition and to require those living at a distance
from fixed railroad stations to journey to the stations and there await the
arrival of trains, rather than to be allowed to take advantage of buses
stopping at their front doors, merely because this would result in financial
loss to the established carrier (the railroad), is not in keeping with ideas
of progress."
See also Re Demoney, Pub. Util. Rep. 1920 C 402, 404; Re Railroad
Broadhead, Pub. Util. Rep. 1924 E 222, 223 (Mont. 1924); Re Carver, Pub.
Util. Rep. 1923 B 242, 247 (Colo. 1922).
96The following cases which have been passed upon by the Ohio and
Illinois commissions serve to illustrate the diversity of problems which con-
front the commissions throughout the country where more than one motor
carrier applies for the same route: In re Application of Merryman (1924)
Ohio Pub. Util. Comm. 47; In re Cadillac Bus Co., ibid. 56; In re Ackley,
ibid. 57; In re Norwalk Bus Co., ibid. 48; In re Cullison (1925) ibid. Nos.
923, 1032, 22 D. R. 202; In re Pickens (1926) ibid. Nos. 1917, 2068, 2047,
24 D. R. 351; Application of Peoria Coach Line, 4 Ill. Commerce Comm. 32
(1924); Application of City Motor Bus Co., ibid. 50 (1924).
97 For examples: The New England Transportation Co., a subsidiary of
the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, was operating 125
busses over nearly 800 miles on January 1, 1926; the Public Service Tran-
portation Co., a New Jersey electric railway, was operating over 800
busses over 90 routes; 51 steam railroads were using motor trucks to
supplement their shipping service. Since the date of.tabulation, use of
motor vehicles by railroads has been increasing at an amazingly rapid
rate. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad has, within the past few months,
ceased to maintain a New York City terminal, and now transports its
passengers to and from its Jersey City station by motor busses.
98 Pub. Util. Rep. 1925 D 332 (Pa. 1925).
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preferred a resort development company over an independent
bus line, in granting a certificate to operate over a new road
to the gate-way of the resort. This order the Supreme Court
reversed, upon appeal, holding that the statute made it man-
datory upon the commission to grant the certificate to the bus
line, because it had been operating in the territory prior to the
opening of the resort. 9
The task of the commissions in controlling the competitive
situation has been made easier by common provisions authorizing
them not simply to grant an application or deny it, but to
grant the application in part only, or grant it upon conditions.
This has given administrative flexibility to the commissions w,1ith-
out which their work would be seriously hampered.
REVOCATION OR ALTERATION OF CERTIFICATES
All the recent enactments requiring certificates, and most of
the commission regulations promulgated under general or spe-
cial statutes, empower the commissions to revoke or alter cer-
tificates of public convenience and necessity. The grounds for
revocation vary. In some states the commission can only revoke
for a violation of orders or rules of the commission or those
laid down by the regulatory statute.10 Since the rules of the
commission often cover the most minute details of operation,
under such statutes a certificate may be revoked for such com-
paratively minor infractions as failure to stop at railroad
crossings, 01 or failure to maintain an operating schedule for
three days.0 2 Where the causes for revocation are set out in
the Act, it has been held that the commission is without power
to revoke for other causes. 10 3
In other states, however, commissions have the same discre-
tion in withdrawing certificates, even when action has been
99 Yelton & McLaughlin v. Department of Public Works, 13G Wash. 445,
240 Pac. 679 (1925) reversing Re Mlount Baker Development Co., Pub. Util.
Rep. 1925 D 705 (Wash. 1925).
100 Idaho Laws 1925, c. 197, § 4; Ky. Act of March 5, 1926, § 13; Ltd.
Ann. Code (Bagby, 1924) art. 56, §§ 255, 262; Mich. Pub. Acts 192", No.
209, § 6; Mont. Laws 1923, c. 154, § 5; N. J. Laws 1926, c. 144, § 3 (of
local consent); N. D. Laws 1925, c. 91, § 4; S. C. Acts 1925, No. 170, § 12
(grounds specified and exclusive); Va. Laws 1924, c. 222, § 3 (grounds
specified and exclusive); Wash. Laws 1921, c. 111, § 3; W. Va. Code
(Barnes, 1925) c. 43, § 82. See State v. Fortaey, 93 W. Va. 292, 116 S. E.
753 (1923) ; but cf. State v. State Road Comm., 131 S. E. 7 (W. Va. 1925).
301 Re automobiles at crossings, Ariz. Corp. Comm , General Order No. 5,
January 15, 1926; Rules and Regulations, Or. Pub. Serv. Comm. Order F,
1297, rule 13.
102 Rules governing motor vehicles, Me. Pub. Util. Comm., July 9, 1921.
103 State v. Fortney, supra note 100. But cf. rule 54, State Road Comm.
of West Virginia, and State v. State Road Comm., aupra note 100.
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taken by the holder in reliance thereon, as they have in the
granting of such certificates. The phrase commonly used in
the Acts is "for good cause" or "for such other cause as the
said Commission may deem sufficient." 104 The courts have sus-
tained revocations when there is fraud or mistake in the issuance
of certificates, and where service has been abandoned. 105
Most of the statutes providing for revocation protect the
holder by requiring ample notice and opportunity to be heard
before such revocation or alteration. 100 In some states an oppor-
tunity is given, after the close of the revocation hearing, to make
the service satisfactory before the certificate is granted to
another10o
APPEAL AND REVIEW OF COMMISSION ORDERS
A commission order granting or denying a certificate of con-
104 See Calif. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1923) Act 5129, § 5 ("for good
cause"); Iowa Acts 1925, c. 5, § 17; Kan. Laws 1925, c. 206, § 8 ("for
good cause"); La. Act of July 15, 1926, § 4 ("for good cause"); Ohio
Code (Page, 1926) § 614-87 ("for a good cause"); Okla. Laws 1923, c. 113.
§ 4; Or. Laws (Spec. Sess.) 1921, c. 10, § 5 ("or for such other cause
as the said Commission may deem sufficient").
See also abstract of Emerick Bus Line Co. v. Bellefonte Transportation
Co., Pub. Util. Rep. 1920 E. 380 (Pa. 1919). It has been held that
revocation is the exercise of a discretionary power, hence mandamus is
not available. State v. State Road Comm., supra note 100.
105 Reynolds v. Alexandria Motor Bus Line, 126 S. E. 201 (Va. 1925)
and see Calistoga Stage Line v. White Transportation Co., Pub. Util. Rep.
1918 E 821 (Calif. 1918); but cf. abstract of Re Swett, Pub. Util. Rep.
1921 C 637 (Calif. 1921).
The following decisions by the Ohio Public Utilities Commission upon
problems of revocation in the motor carrier field illustrate many of the
types of cases which commissions in the various states have now or will
have presented to them for their administrative judgment: Re Youngstown
v. Hogan (1924) Ohio Pub. Util. Comm. 60; Re Conch, Jr., ibid. 41;
Stewart v. Westhoven, ibid. 149, aff'd in Westhoven v. Public Utilities
Comm., 112 Ohio St. 411, 147 N. E. 759 (1925); Dayton & Western Trde-
tion Co. v. Red Star Transportation Line (1924) Ohio Pub. Util. Comm.
117; Seals Bus Line v. Zupfel Bus Line, ibid. 109; Vasbinder v. Senville,
ibid. 115; Shields v. Moore (1925) ibid., 22 D. R. 295; Application of the
Northern Ohio Traction Co., ibid., 22 D. R. 440; Powell v. Coombs, ibid.,
21 D. R. 373; Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Carley, ibid., 22 D. R, 234; Shafer
v. Schelling, ibid., 21 D. R. 460; Matter of Long, ibid., 21 D. R. 350;
Southern Ohio R. S. Co. v. Danniells, ibid., 22 D. R. 30.
100 E.g. Calif. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1923) Act 5129, § 5; Kan. Laws 1925,
c. 206, § 8; Ky. Act. of March 5, 1926, § 13; La. Act. of July 15, 1926, § 4;
Mich. Pub. Acts 1923, No. 209, § 6; Minn. Laws 1925, c. 185, § 4; Miss.
Laws 1926, c. 128, § 5; Mont. Laws 1923, c. 154, § 5; N. J. Laws 1926, c.
144, § 3; N. C. Laws 1925, c. 50, § 5; N. D. Laws 1925, c. 91, § 4; Okla.
Laws 1923, c. 113, § 4; Or. Laws (Spec. Sess.) 1921, c. 10, § 5; Wash.
Comp. Stat. (Remington, 1922) § 6389.
107 E. g. Ohio Code (Page, 1926) § 614-87; La. Act of July 15, 1926,
No. 292, § 4. This seems also to be the practice of some commissions;
e. g. (in another field) see Odin v. Odin Coal Co., 4 Ill. Commerce Comm.
276 (1925).
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venience and necessity, or revoking or altering such a certificate,
may be reviewed in the courts; the statutes almost without ex-
ception so provide,"' and even where there is no such express
provision, it has been held that the right exists. 1'
The general constitutional principles which make access to
the courts necessary for those aggrieved by administrative or-
ders apply of course to commission orders denying or granting
certificates to motor carriers.1 0  In determining whether such
an order of the commission should stand or be set aside, the
various supreme courts have applied the same limitation upon
their reviewing function as in cases involving other commission
orders in other fields. Some courts inquire into the weight of
the evidence."' The courts of other states reverse the order
of the commission only if plainly unlawful or unsupported by
evidence.2- In some situations some courts will go much fur-
108 Examples of such statutes include Calif. Stat. 1925, c. 152, at
303; Colo. Comp. Laws (1921) §§ 2960, 2961; Conn. Pub. Acts 1921, c. 77,
§ 7; D. C. Ann. Code 1924, Appendix, Pub. Util. par. 05; IM. Rev. Stat.
(Cahill, 1923) c. ila, §§ 74, 87, 83, 90; 4 Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1914)
§§, 10052z2-10052e3; Iowa Acts 1925, c. 5, § 10; Ky. Act of March 5,
1926, §§ 12, 13, 16, 17, 18; BId. Ann. Code (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, It 259;
Mich. Comp. Laws (Cahill, 1922) § 8164 (9), and Laws 1923, No. 209, §9
4, 5; Blinn. Laws 1925, c. 185, § 12; Mont. Laws 1923, c. 154, § 7; Neb. Comp.
Stat. (1922) § 5499; Nev. Laws 1923, c. 181, § 9; N. Y. Laws 1918, c. 130, at
305; N. C. Laws 1925, c. 50, § 5; N. D. Laws 1925, c. 91, § 10; Or. Laws
(Spec. Sess.) 1921, c. 10, § 7; Pa. Stat. (West, 1920) §9 18178, 13192;
R. I. Gen. Laws 1923, § 3730; S. C. Acts 1925, No. 170, § 12; S. D. Law3
1925, c. 224, § 18; Utah Comp. Laws (1917) §§ 4834-4837; Vt. Laws 1923,
No. 74, § 6; Va. Gen. Laws (1923) § 3734; Va. Laws 1924, c. 222, § 3;
Wis. Stat. 1925, §§ 194.04, 196.42, 196.47; Wash. Laws 1921, c. 111, § 6;
Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1920) §§ 5511-5516.
109 Ex parte Sales, 108 Okla. 29, 233 Pac. 186 (1925).
'110 See Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Adwinistiativc Action by T
Federal Supreme Court (1922) 35 HARv. L. REv. 127; Curtis, Judicial
Review of Commission (1921) 34 HARV. L. REV. 862.
'The Illinois cases are good illustrations of this standard. See Egyp-
tian Transportation Co. v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., supr note 15 (com-
mission order granting certificate to bus line paralleling steam railroad
set aside); Superior lotor Bus Co. v. Community lotor Bus Co., 320 IMI.
175, 150 N. E. 668 (1926) (2 bus applicants; commission order set
aside); Choate v. Commerce Comm., szpra note 0 (commission found exist-
ing service required supplementation; order set aside); West Suburban T.
Co. v. Chicago & W. T. Ry., 309 Ill. 87, 140 N. E. 56 (1923) (commission
found existing public need; order set aside); Chicago lotor Bus Co. v.
Chicago Stage Co., 287 Ill. 320, 122 N. E. 477 (1919) (two motor ap-
plicants; commission order set aside).
In Indiana, in an action to set aside an order of the commission, the
lower court must hear the evidence de novo. Public Service Comm. v.
Lake Erie & W. Ry., 191 Ind. 436, 133 N. E. 492 (1922).
112 See Gruber v. Commonwealth, supra note 74, at 318, 125 S. E. at 428;
Carroll v. Commonwealth, supra note 79; Royal Green Coach Co. v. Pub-
lic Utilities Comm., 110 Ohio St. 41, 143 N. E. 547 (1924); State v. Depart-
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ther; in effect they regard the decision of the commission on
such a question as the choice between applicants as final, and set
it aside only in the rare case where there is no evidence at all
to support the finding, where the procedural requirements im-
bedded in due process of law have not been observed, the plain
provisiqns of the statute ignored, or the commission's discretion
abused.113
ENFORCEMENT OF CERTIFICATES
The task of enforcing the legal situation which the issuance
of certificates of convenience and necessity creates, is a dual
one. First of all, the holder of a certificate must be required
to comply with the conditions embodied within the certificate
itself; the provisions of the public utility and other applicable
statutes, and general commission regulations must be enforced
against him. The second problem of enforcement is to prevent
operation by non-holders, operators who properly come within
the class from which certificates are demanded, but to whom
such certificates have never been granted.
The statutes usually specifically provide for the certificate
holder who violates the provisions of his certificate, the statutes,
or the rulings of the commission. A penalty, either by fine, or
both fine and imprisonment, is usual ;114 his certificate may be
revoked;115 the commission is frequently specifically empowered
to resort to injunction or mandamus to enforce its orders.11
ment of Public Works, 129 Wash. 5, 223 Pac. 1048 (1924); In re Stolting,
131 Wash. 392, 230 Pac. 405 (1924); Gongaware v. Public Service Comm.,
83 Pa. Super. Ct. 269 (1924); State v. Darazzo, 97 Conn. 728, 118 Atl. 81
(1922) ; Holmes v. Railroad Comm., 242 Pac. 486, 490 (Calif. 1925).
113 See Modeste v. Public Utilities Comm., 97 Conn. 453, 458, 117 Atl.
494, 496 (1922); People v. Hadley, supra note 77; In re Samoset Co., 131
Atl. 692, 693 (Me. 1926); Royal Green Coach Co. v. Public Utilities Comm.,
supra note 112; cf. Chicago Bus Co. v. Chicago Stage Co., supra note 111.
114 Colo. Comp. Laws (1921) § 2970 et seq; Conn. Pub. Acts 1921, c. 77,
§ 8; D. C. Ann. Code (1924) Appendix, Pub. Util. par. 81-86; Idaho Laws
1925, c. 1917, § 7; Ind. Laws 1925, c. 46, § 8; Iowa Acts 1925, c. 5, § 18;
Kan. Laws 1925, c. 206, § 9; Ky. Act of March 5, 1926, § 39; Md. Ann.
Code (Bagby, 1924) art. 56, §§ 256, 263, art 23, § 383; Mass. Acts 1925,
c. 280, § 3; Mich. Pub. Acts 1923, No. 209, § 9; Minn. Laws 1925, c. 185,
§ 13; Miss. Laws 1926, c. 128, § 18; Mont. Laws 1923, c. 154, § 9; Nov.
Laws 1925, c. 161, § 3; N. J. Laws 1926, c. 144, § 5; N. Y. Cons. Lawg
(Cahill, 1923) c. 49, § 57; N. C. Laws 1925, c. 50, § 11; 1 Ohio Gen. Code
(Page, 1926) §§ 614-65, 614-68; Okla. Laws 1923, c. 113, § 10; Or. Laws
(Spec. Sess.) 1921, c. 10, § 9; Pa. Stat. (West, 1920) §§ 18197, 18206;
R. I. Gen. Laws 1923, § 3731; S. C. Acts 1925, No. 170, § 14; S. D. Laws
1925, c. 224, § 22; Utah Comp. Staf. (1917) §§ 4839-4849; Vt. Laws 1925,
No. 74, § 7; Va. Laws 1924, c. 222, § 8; Va. Laws 1923, § 3716; W. Va.
Ann. Code (Barnes, 1925) c. 43, § 82; Wash. Laws 1921, c. 11, § 7; Wis.
Stat. 1925, § 194.06; Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1920) §§ 5517-5528.
115 See supra, under "Revocation."
110 Colo. Gen. Laws (1921) § 2970; D. C. Ann. Code (1924) Appendix,
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The fact that the operator has already been prosecuted under
the penalty provisions does not preclude use of other remedial
means by the commission, the enforcement provisions being held
cumulative, not exclusive. 1 7
A more difficult problem of enforcement is presented by the
motor carrier operating illegally without a certificate of con-
venience. Such an operator may be a carrier whose certificate
has been revoked, but who continues to operate in spite of the
commission's orders; he may be one who has never applied for
a certificate, claiming that he is not within the classes of carriers
covered by the Act. In either case, his violation of the law
affects not only the commission, which is usually under a duty
to enforce the law; the effect is more serious upon the authorized
operator along the same route, or upon an established rail car-
rier, in whose interests on behalf of the public need for sound
transportation, the legislature provided for the issuance of cer-
tificates.
While most of the statutes are explicit enough in authorizing
the commission, through the courts, to prosecute or enjoin such
illegal operators, only a few authorize such action by certified
operators suffering damage by such illegal operation. But the
courts have not been slow in granting such relief on the suit
of those showing damage to their interests. Loss of revenue
to a street railroad is held to be sufficient "special damage" to
entitle it to injunctive relief against unauthorized operation.228
It is not necessary that the injured party first complain to the
commission, empowered to enforce the law; he may at once seek
relief in a court of appropriate jurisdiction.110 The recognition
Pub. Util. par. 91; Ind. Laws 1925, c. 46, § 9; Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923)
§§ 66-139, 66-181; 1 Md. Ann. Code (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 333, art. 256,
art 265; Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 159, §§ 40, 48; Mass. Acts 1925, c.
280, § 3; Mich. Pub. Acts 1923, No. 209, § 10; N. J. Laws 192G, c. 144,
§ 5; N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 49, § 57; 1 Ohio Gen. Code (Page,
1926) § 614-69; Pa. Stat. (West, 1920) §§ 18195, 13190; S. D. Laws 1925,
c. 224, § 17; Utah Comp. Stat. (1917) § 4842; Vt. Gen. Laws (1917)
§ 5061 (VI); Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1920) § 5509.
3 .7State v. State Road Comm., sUpra note 100; Public Utilities Commis-
sioners v. Sheldon, 95 N. J. Eq. 408, 124 At. 65 (1924). It was held in
People v. Carr, 231 Mich. 246, 203 N. W. 948 (1925) that prosecutions for
illegal operation might be initiated by private individuals,
3-1S Puget Sound Traction Co. v. Grassmeyer, 102 Wash. 482, 173 Pac.
504 (1918); Memphis Street Ry. v. Rapid Transit Co., 133 Tenn. 594, 170
S. W. 635 (1916).
3119 People v. Watt, 115 Misc. 120, 188 N. Y. Supp. 559 (Sup. Ct. 1921);
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Schoenfeldt, 123 Wash. 579, 213 Pac. 20 (1923); State
v. Superior Court, 123 Wash. 116, 212 Pac. 259 (1923); Danville, U. & C.
Ry. v. Clark Truck. Co., 231 Ill. App. 339 (1924); Huntington Traction Co.
v. Walker, 209 App. Div. 904, 205 N. F. Supp. 394 (2d Dept. 1921). And
the fact that the operator committed a crime by failing to obtain a license
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of a property right which the law's remedies are inadequate to
protect, but which equity is able to safeguard against inter-
ference, is one of the familiar aspects of the rapid development
of the law in this new field.
120
is no bar to injunctive relief. N. Y., N. H. & H. Ry. v. Delster, 253 Mass.
178, 148 N. E. 590 (1925).
120 In the following illustrative cases the courts have granted relief to
public utilities injured by the unauthorized operation of motor carriers:
Chelan Transfer Co. v. Foote, 130 Wash. 511, 228 Pac. 297 (1924); Carson
v. Woodram, 95 W. Va. 197, 120 S. E. 512 (1923); Puget Sound Traction
Co. v. Grassmeyer, supra note 118; Northern Pacific Ry. v. Schoenfeldt,
supra note 119; Danville Ry. v. Clark Truck Co., supra note 119; Poca-
hontas Transportation Co. v. Craft, 130 S. E. 468 (W. Va. 1925); Newport
Electric Corp. v. Oakley, 129 Atl. 613 (R. I. 1925); Darling v. Darling,
118 Misc. 817, 194 N. Y. Supp. 897 (Sup. Ct. 1922) ; Public Utilities Comm.
v. Garviloch, 54 Utah, 406, 416, 181 Pac. 272, 276 (1919); United Trac-
tion Co. v. Smith, 115 Misc. 73, 187 N. Y. Supp. 377 (Sup. Ct. 1921). But
cf. Davis & Banker v. Metcalf, 131 Wash. 141, 229 Pac. 2 (1924); Public
Service Ry. v. Barnett, 92 N. J. Eq. 372, 116 Atl. 793 (1921); Grand
Rapid Ry. v. Stevens, 219 Mich. 332, 189 N. W. 2 (1922); Healy v.
Sidone, 127 Atl. 520 (N. J. Eq. 1923); In re James, 98 Vt. 477, 129 At].
175 (1925); Kinder v. Looney, 283 S. W. 9 (Ark. 1926).
